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REPLACEMENT OF WORKERS DURING STRIKES
Since NLRB v. Machay Radio & Tel. Co.' it has been the settled rule
in labor law that an employer may hire permanent replacements for his
workers who are striking to force compliance with the union's collec-
tive bargaining demands2 (economic strikes). There are some practical
considerations which may restrain the employer from exercising his
right. He may have a large stockpile of goods and may be indifferent
to a shutdown. Or, lie may desire to hire replacements, but the general
condition of the labor market and the unwillingness of laborers to be-
come strikebreakers3 may deter him from doing So.4 Despite these dif-
ficulties permanent replacement during economic strikes is a wide-
spread practice which has great impact on both the worker and the
union.5 Generally, a striking employee has a right to reinstatement after
the strike is over.6 He loses this right, however, when he is permanently
1. 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
2. See, e.g., Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 531 F.2d 720, 722-29 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 888 (1964); The employer is limited only by his duty not to discriminate against
the union. See, e.g., Arthur J. Wiltsie, 85 NLRB 58 (1949), enforced, sub nom Ann Arbor
Press v. NLRB, 188 F.2d 917 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 859 (1951).
3. "A scab is a two-legged animal with a corkscrew soul, a waterlogged brain, a com-
bination backbone of jelly and glue. Where others have hearts, he carries a tumor of
rotten principles." Jack London, C.I.O. News, September 20, 1946.
4. Furthermore, there is a conflict among the circuits as to whether an employer can
pay permanent replacements more than his last offer to the union. The Sixth Circuit has
ruled that they may be offered slightly higher wages. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v.
NLRB, 186 F.2d 106, 109 (6th Cir. 1950). The Tenth has found that such an offer dis-
criminates against the union and is evidence of an employer bargaining violation. NLRB
v. St. Clair Lime Co., 315 F.2d 224, 228 (10th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Southwestern Porcelain
Steel Corp., 317 F.2d 527, 531 (10th Cir. 1963). If the later view is, as seems likely, ulti-
mately accepted, the employer will be further prevented from exercising his right to hire
replacements.
5. For example, in October 1962, the Teamsters were certified as the bargaining repre-
sentative of a unit of twenty-two employees. After bargaining through December, the
union called a strike on January 4. Three days later all twenty-two employees were perma-
nently replaced. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 146 NLRB 802 (1964). With a larger or more skilled
work force, the effect of the replacement rule is less dramatic.
6. Section 2(3), 49 Stat. 450 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964) preserves the striker's status
as an "employee" who is protected by the Labor Act. See also, Editorial "El Imparcal,"
Inc., 123 NLRB 1585 (1959); Kitty Clover, Inc., 103 NLRB 1665, enforced, 208 F.2d 212 (8th
Cir. 1953). However, the employer is under no duty to reinstate a striker whose job has been
deleted for economic reasons, NLRB v. National Die Casting Co., 207 F.2d 344 (7th Cir.
1953); who has failed to make within a reasonable time an unconditional request for
reinstatement, NLRB v. Brown & Root, 203 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1953), Crosby Chems., Inc.,
105 NLRB 152 (1953); or who is guilty of strike misconduct, Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB,
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replaced7 The possibility of replacement obviously must be taken into
account by union members considering a strike vote. The fear of perma-
nent replacement has been intensified by the NLRB's practice of de-
ferring completely to the employer's classification of the replacement
as permanent or temporary.8
In spite of the obvious importance of any replacement rule the first
statement of the present rule was not very well considered. In Mackay
the Supreme Court held that management's selective replacement of
union leaders violated section 8(a)(3) by discriminating against union
members. Then followed the famous dictum that the employer has
"the right to protect and continue his business" by permanently re-
placing economic strikers, and "he is not bound to discharge those hired
to fill the places of strikers. . . ." This dictum was consistent with the
common law rule that an employer had no duty to rehire an employee
who stopped work for any reason. 10 But the Wagner Act was passed to
change many of the aspects of the previous law governing employment
relationships. 1 It should not have been sufficient to rely upon the com-
mon law in Mackay. The Labor Board in Mackay did not discuss the
basis of the permanent replacement rule and, in fact, did not even focus
on the general question of replacement. Instead, the Board inquired
316 U.S. 31 (1942) (mutiny), NLRB v. Fansted Metallurgical Corp., 306 US. 240 (1939)
(violence during a sitdown strike), W. L. Mead, Inc., 113 NLRII 1040 (1955) (economic
strike in breach of a no-strike clause). However, the employer must reinstate those strikers
whose misconduct he has condoned. NLRB v. E. A. Labs., Inc., 188 F.2d 885 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 871 (1951).
In NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 348 US. 883 (1954), Judge
Magruder set out the thesis that 1) in an economic strike, in which there was no unfair
labor practice, an employee discharged for conduct beyond the protection of § 7 could not
be reinstated but 2) in an unfair labor practice strike, the Board could reinstate a striker
even if his conduct was beyond the protection of § 7 so long as he was not discharged "for
cause" under § 10(c). Judge Bazelon adopted the latter strain of this argument in Local
883, UAV v. NLRPB, 300 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962). See also,
Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L. REv. 319, 324 n.24 (1951).
7. See, e.g., Cranston Print Works Co., 115 NLR.B 537, 567 (1956). But see Marydale
Prods. Co., 133 NLRB 1232 (1961), where new employees were found not to be "replace-
ments" because they would have been hired regardless of the strike.
8. See, e.g., The Texas Co., 93 NLRB 1358, 1362 (1951), in which the Board held that
the employer's assurance of permanent employment was sufficient despite the fact that the
replacement had to serve a probationary period. The Board defers to managements
characterization because of the difficulty of determining the precise relationship between
employer and employee. For example, employment contracts are seldom made. See text
accompanying note 43 infra.
9. 504 U.S. at 345.
10. See Adair v. United States, 208 US. 161 (1908); Union Pac. Ry. v. Ruef, 120 Fed.
102 (C.C.D. Neb. 1902). See generally Note, 24 U. VA. L REv. 661 (1938).
11. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1937).
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into only the narrow issue of discriminatory employment.' 2 However,
in a reply brief to the Supreme Court, 3 the Board accepted Mackay's
assertion that as a public utility it had a right and duty to hire perma-
nent replacements. 14 The rule which emanated from the Mackay case
was not litigated before the Board and was inadequately argued before
the Court. Despite this lack of consideration, the dictum has been fol-
lowed blindly.' 5 In view of its background and its continuing impact
in economic strikes the permanent replacement rule should now be re-
considered.
Replacement rules might be viewed as tools to establish bargaining
equality between management and labor. For example, the NLRB
might allow only temporary replacements if it believed that labor
needed greater bargaining power.16 Setting aside the difficulties of con-
structing a series of rules designed to equalize the positions of employer
and employee, such an approach is not now available. As the Supreme
Court stated in American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB,17 the Board does
not have "a general authority to assess the relative economic power of
the adversaries in the bargaining process and to deny weapons to one
party or the other because of its assessment of that party's bargaining
power."' 8 In order to determine the legality of a lockout after a bar-
gaining impasse, the Supreme Court turned to the text and legislative
history of the LMRA.
Similarly, instead of being judged in terms of bargaining power, re-
placement rules must be judged in terms of those provisions of the
Labor Act which define allowable employer activity, in particular,
section 8(a)(3),19 which proscribes employer "discrimination in regard
to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employ-
ment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organiza-
12. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 1 NLRB 201, 216-17 (1936).
13. The pertinent portion is reprinted in Boudin, The Rights of Strikers, 35 ILL. L.
REV. 817, 831 (1941).
14. Brief for Respondent, p. 24, NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
15. See, e.g., Adams Bros. Manifold Printing Co., 17 NLRB 974, 980 (1939).
16. This argument would have particular validity in the context of permanent re-
placement. As a weapon for management, permanent replacement is most effective against
weak unions. In general, the strength of a labor organization is inversely proportional to
the number of non-union workers capable of filling strikers' jobs. Thus, replacement, which
must draw upon such workers, can be effectively utilized against only weak unions; against
strong unions it is an impotent management weapon.
17. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
18. Id. at 317.
19. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964). See Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., I




tion." A violation of this section is usually established by showing an
overt act or statement reflecting anti-union discrimination.20 However,
direct proof of the employer's intent is not always required; in some
circumstances discrimination can be presumed from his conduct.2
Recently, in two separate cases, the Supreme Court attempted to
establish guidelines for the use of such a presumption. Mr. Justice
Stewart, writing for the majority in American Ship Bldg., stated that
the Board could find discriminatory intent in employer conduct which
is "prejudicial to union interests" and is "devoid of significant economic
justification."22 The application of this standard would rarely, if ever,
lead to the presumption of discriminatory intent. For example, even
selective discharge of union leaders, clearly illegal under section 8(a)
(3),23 could have "significant economic justification." The employer
may desire to rid his plant of the union in order to lower wages.
The test of NLRB v. Brown2 4 differs fundamentally from that of
American Ship Bldg., although the two cases were decided on the same
day by the same majority. In Brown, the Court stated that illicit intent
could be presumed from conduct that is "destructive of employee
rights" and "devoid of significant service to any legitimate business
end."28 The qualification "legitimate" distinguishes the Brown test
from the meaningless one of American Ship Bldg. This distinction was
recognized by Mr. Justice Goldberg who concurred in both opinions.
He disagreed with the American Ship Bldg. test and stated that only
"legitimate economic interests of the employer" should be recognized.
In Brown, however, Mr. Justice Goldberg accepted the majority's
formulation. 28 The opinions in the two cases differ in another respect.
Brown states explicitly that a violation of section 8(a)(3) can be found
even in conduct which serves a legitimate business purpose if that pur-
pose is outweighed by a prejudicial effect upon employees. -O Since the
Supreme Court has in the past found violations despite a legitimate
20. For a collection of cases, see Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 US. 17. 43 (1954).
21. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228 (1963).
22. 380 U.S. at 311.
23. See, e.g., NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402 (7th Cir.). cert. denied, 363
U.S. 823 (1961).
24. 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
25. Some commentators have failed to recognize the difference. See, e.g., Oberer, Lock-
outs and the Law, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 193, 209 (1966).
26. 380 U.S. at 286. (Emphasis supplied.)
27. Id. at 340.
28. Id. at 292-94.
29. "[C]onduct so inherently destructive of employee rights could not be saved from
illegality by an asserted overriding business purpose pursued in good faith." Id. at 287.
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business interest, 0 the Brown test corresponds more closely to past de-
cisions. If Brown is to be followed the legitimate business interest served
by the permanent replacement rule must be compared with its impact
on employee rights granted by the Labor Act.
The hiring of permanent replacements may have three principal ef-
fects on strikers. Allowing the employment of permanent replacements
enables management to continue its business during the work stoppage
and thus weakens the bargaining position of the union.,, But the Labor
Act does not guarantee employees a maximum bargaining position, 2
and such an effect could not serve as the basis of a section 8(a)(3) viola-
tion. The other two effects of permanent replacement, however, do
impinge upon guaranteed employee rights.
Section 13 of the LMRA expressly refers to labor's "right to strike."
Other sections of the Act reinforce this fundamental guarantee.3 But
its full exercise is restrained by permanent replacement. At times, even
the threat of such replacement may prevent the calling of a work stop-
page or cause a striking union to surrender to management's demands.
For the strike may result in the permanent loss of members' jobs and
the elimination of pension, seniority or other rights acquired through
previous service.
A second effect of the Mackay rule undermines the union's status as
bargaining representative. Replacements are likely to be anti-union and
may, if permanent, vote in certification elections held during a strike.04
An employer can hire, and characterize as "permanent," a sufficient
number of strikebreakers to force the union's decertification. This
weapon gives him control over the decision whether or not his plant
will be unionized by allowing him to nullify the strikers' choice of a
bargaining representative. Of course, if replacements are, in fact, perma-
nent they deserve a voice in the organization of the plant. However, the
30. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
31. So, too, does hiring temporary replacements. On the other hand, temporary replace-
ments do not impinge upon guaranteed employee rights. See text accompanying notes 40.43
infra.
32. For example, the right to strike is limited by the sixty day waiting period of § 8(d),
61 Stat. 142-43 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964). Also, the union is not always granted the
right to determine the timing and duration of every work stoppage. See, American Ship
Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 310 (1965).
33. §§ 7, 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 2(3). See also NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 223
(1963).
54. Originally, replacements were ineligible to vote. A. Sartorius & Co., 10 NLRB 493
(1938), reversing 9 NLRB 19 (1938). Permanent replacements were franchised only after




Labor Board usually defers completely to the employer's characteriza-
tion.35 It is extremely easy for the employer to call a temporary em-
ployee permanent. And if the replacements are really temporary their
votes in a certification election dilute the striking employees' rights to
choose their own bargaining representative. This choice is a funda-
mental one, guaranteed by sections 7 and 8 of the Labor Act.
The facts underlying United Rubber Workersa" provide an example
of this impact. In that case, the union won a representation election by
a substantial margin but failed to negotiate a collective bargaining
agreement. A strike followed, and the employer reacted by permanently
replacing most of the union members. A year later, another certifica-
tion election was held. With the replacements voting, the union was
defeated 288 to 5.
In 1959 Congress mitigated these anti-union effects by amending
section 9(c)(3) of the Labor Act. The Board was given the power to allow
permanently replaced strikers to vote in certification elections during
the strike.37 (Temporarily replaced and unreplaced strikers had always
been eligible to vote.)38 However, Congress did not disenfranchise the
permanent replacements, nor did it prohibit the employer from char-
acterizing the replacements as he pleased. Although the amendment
makes the employer's job more difficult, he may still undermine the
35. At present, for voting purposes, the Board presumes that all replacements are per-
manent. Pacific Tile & Porcelain Co., 137 NLRB 1358, 1360 (1962). For the difficult task fac-
ing a union attempting to challenge this presumption, see Bowman Transp.. Inc., 142
NLRB 1093 (1963).
36. 121 NLRB 1439, 1442-43 (1958).
37. "Employees engaged in an economic strike who are not entitled to reinstatement
shall be eligible to vote under such regulations as the Board shall find are consistent with
the purposes and provisions of this Act in any election conducted within twelve months
after the commencement of the strike." 73 Stat. 542, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(2) (1964). Although
the Board has the power to make rules, [§ 6, 49 Stat. 452 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 156 (194);
Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE
L.J. 729, 751-52 (1961)], it has not chosen to exercise it. W. Wilton Woods, Inc., 127 NLRB
1675 (1960). Instead, despite an attempt to compel it to make rules in accordance with the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, Boire v. Miami Herald Pub. Co., 343
F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1965), the Board has proceeded by adjudication.
In Pacific Tiles & Porcelain Co., 137 NLRB 1358 (1958), the Board acknowledged the
settled rule that once an economic striker obtains permanent employment, he is no longer
entitled to vote. See, e.g., Horton's Laundry, Inc., 72 NLRB 1129, 1135-37 (1947). However,
the Board also recognized the rule that the striker's intent to return to work was the key
factor. See Oates Bros., Inc., 127 NLRB 1674 (1960). Because of the difficulty of proving
the striker's intent, the Board ruled that it would presume that all strikers intended to
return to work. Pacific Tile 6 Porcelain Co., supra at 1359. As a result, replaced strikers
are entitled to vote.
38. A. Sartorius & Co., 10 NLRB 493 (1938), reversing 9 NLRB 19 (1938).
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union's majority by hiring replacements, characterizing them as perma-
nent, and thereby swelling the electorate.80
To offset these anti-union effects the employer may offer various
legitimate business justifications. Permanent replacements have always
been considered necessary to promote one fundamental employer in-
terest-the right to "protect and continue" his business during a
strike.40 This legitimate business purpose, however, may be served by
temporary replacements also. Since only permanent replacements have
an anti-union effect, the Mackay rule could be justified only if perma-
nent replacements serve a business purpose which could not be served
by temporary replacements. This justification might be valid if it could
be shown that the offer of permanent work is necessary to induce a
replacement to accept employment. 41 There are two possible ways to
evaluate this justification.
Perhaps an investigation of the employer's labor market would show
the necessity of offering permanent employment. In such an inquiry
conditions in both the national and local labor markets would have to
be considered. Another relevant statistic would be the number of quali-
fied applicants for replacement work. In addition, their past employ-
ment history, such as prior wages and months out of work, would be
relevant. But even this summary listing of the factors which the Board
would have to investigate highlights the difficulty, if not the impos-
sibility, of determining necessary inducement from a study of the labor
market. Were the Board to make such an examination in every case,
it would have little time to devote to its other responsibilities.
Perhaps the employer should be allowed to show necessary induce-
ment by showing that he has in fact induced the employee to work by
giving him benefits greater than temporary employment. It is probably
valid to assume that if the employer has given some substantial benefits
it was necessary to do so. 4 2 But to prove that the employer has given
something more than temporary employment he must show that the
employee has an enforceable claim against him to assure tenure extend-
ing substantially beyond the end of the strike. If the replacement has
39. See NLRB v. United Furniture Workers, 337 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1964), where, despite
the new voting rules, the union was displaced.
40. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938).
41. It has been assumed that permanent employment is often a necessary inducement
to a replacement. See Note, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 368, 376 (1960). See also Comment, 60 Nw.
U.L. REv. 689, 713 (1965); Intermediate Report and Recommended Order, Hot Shoppes,
Inc., 146 NLRB 802, 807, 835 (1964).
42. Of course such an arrangement would not preclude the employer from making
permanent contracts when they were not necessary so that he could displace the union
employees; however, it would put a cost on, and hopefully deter, such displacement.
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no such claim, although the employer may characterize him as "perma-
nent," he has no greater rights, and therefore has been offered no greater
inducement than a temporary replacement. Similarly, without such
enforceable rights, the characterization has cost the employer nothing
and he is free to apply it solely to achieve anti-union effects. Today, the
usual employment relationship neither serves as the basis for proving
necessary inducement nor imposes any cost upon the employer. "The
generality of employees have no employment contracts, and are not
employed for definite terms."43 The employer is free to release "perma-
nent" replacements, and only a desire to undermine the union binds
him to retain them until after the strike is settled.
Necessary inducement could be established, therefore, only if the re-
placements obtained contracts for a specific term of employment. How-
ever, in addition to the purely business considerations which would
make an employer reluctant to enter into such a contract, its legal
consequences under the Labor Act virtually preclude its use. It is clear
that the provisions of a replacement contract potentially would conflict
with any subsequent agreement that might be reached between the
employer and the union. NLRB v. J.I. Case44 makes it equally clear
that when such a conflict occurs the individual contract must yield to
the collective one. Thus, the contract offered to a replacement may be
no contract at all, since management would not be required to honor
it in the face of a subsequent collective agreement.45
An employment contract for a specific term would also appear to
violate the proscription against granting superseniority to replacements
announced by the Supreme Court in Erie Resister Co. v. NLRB. 0 In
that case, replacements had been granted twventy years seniority in
order to assure their employment after the end of the strike. The Court
ruled that the grant of superseniority violated section 8(a)(3)47 even if
it had been necessary to induce the replacements to accept employment.
43. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 146 NLRB 802, 832 (1964).
44. 321 US. 332 (1944).
45. Furthermore, it is unlikely that management would have to pay damages for the
breach of the individual contract. J. I. Case v. NLRB, supra note 44 at 337. 338, 342. Such
payment by management would vitiate the effect of superseding the individual contract
by the collective one.
46. 373 U.s. 221 (1963).
47. Id. at 231. Furthermore, if the employer insists that the union accept a super-
seniority plan, he violates his duty to bargain imposed by § 8(a)(5) 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964). See Philip Carey Mlfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964); Griffin Wheel Co. v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1963). It
should be noted that the rationale for § 8(a)(3) employed in Erie Resistor wvas expressly
approved by the Supreme Court in Brown. See text accompanying and notes 28 and 29
supra.
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A contract which guaranteed the replacement employment for a period
of months would have the same effect as a grant of superseniority. For
example, if the replacement were given a five year contract, he would
be retained in preference to the replaced striker even though the latter
would have greater seniority. And, if layoffs became necessary during
the term of the replacement's contract, other workers with greater
seniority would lose their jobs before he would lose his.
The duty to bargain, imposed on the employer by section 8(a)(5), 48
may also prevent him from entering into contracts of permanent em-
ployment. It is a common practice for the union to insist upon the
reinstatement of strikers as a condition of the strike settlement.49 Since
the parties may insist only upon those subjects about which there is a
duty to bargain,50 and since no charges of unfair labor practice by the
union have been found, it seems likely that no one has even questioned
that there is a duty to bargain about reinstatement. Also Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Co. v. NLRB 51 held that the employer has a duty to bar-
gain about subcontracting unit work, and that he violated that duty by
contracting without first consulting the union. The existence of a strike
does not terminate the duty of both parties to bargain.5 2 Thus, Fibre-
board would also seem to require the employer, as part of the strike
settlement, to bargain about his adherence to any subcontracting ar-
rangements made during the strike.53 If there is a duty to bargain about
subcontracting arrangements made during a strike, then there should
also be a duty to bargain about permanent replacements hired during
the strike since subcontracting and replacement decisions have the
same effect upon the employees. If, as seems probable, such a duty
exists, the employer would be committing an unfair labor practice by
contracting with the replacements to keep them after the settlement of
the strike. For by so contracting, the employer would make it difficult
48. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
49. See The Philip Carey Mfg. Co., 140 NLRB 1103, 1105 (1963), enforccd, 331 F.2d 720,
728 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 579 U.S. 888 (1964). See also Gen. Counsel Ad. Decis, SR-1763,
1962 CCH LAB. L. REP. 11,076.
50. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 213 F.2d 374, 376 (7th Cir. 1954).
51. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
52. See, e.g., NLRB v. United States Cold Storage Corp., 203 F.2d 924 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 818 (1953); NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 130 F.2d 919, 927 (2d Cir.
1942).
53. In Hawaii Meat Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 397, 399 (9th Cir. 1963), the Ninth Circuit
assumed that, upon the union's request, the employer would have to bargain about the
continuation of such subcontracting. It is clear that the employer need not bargain about
his initial decision either to subcontract, NLRB v. Abbott Publishing Co., 331 F.2d 209
(7th Cir. 1964), Shell Oil Co., 149 NLRB No. 22 (Oct. 29, 1964), or to hire replacements,
Times Publishing Co., 72 NLRB 676, 684 (1947), during the strike.
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to bargain in good faith about the reinstatement of the replaced strikers
after the strike.
Two conclusions may be drawn from the discussion of permanent
replacement. Either it can never serve a legitimate business interest
(since offering a permanent position cannot be justified as necessary
inducement to obtain replacements), or, when the offer might be justi-
fied as a necessary inducement it is illegal on other grounds. And since
permanent replacement undermines employee rights guaranteed by
the Labor Act, the current replacement rule employed by the Board
for economic strikes is inconsistent with the requirements of section
8(a)(3) as interpreted in Brown.
Any argument for a different interpretation of 8(a)(3) based on Con-
gress's 1959 amendment to section 9(c)(3) should be rejected. In 1959
Congress acted to mitigate the effects of the Mackay rule by providing
that "[e]mployees engaged in an economic strike who are not entitled
to reinstatement shall be eligible to vote under such regulations as the
Board shall find are consistent with the purposes and provisions of this
Act in any election conducted within twelve months after the com-
mencement of the strike."5 4 Admittedly, when Congress used the words
"economic strikers not entitled to reinstatement," it recognized the
existence of the Mackay rule. But to read 9(c)(3) as an affirmance by
Congress of the Mackay dictum would contradict the purpose of the
1959 amendment.55 Moreover, the elimination of the permanent re-
placement rule would not render section 9(c)(3) meaningless; it would
still apply to workers who were not entitled to reinstatement for rea-
sons other than permanent replacement.15
In addition to the requirements of section 8(a)(3), there exists an-
other argument against the permanent replacement rule in economic
strikes. It is the confusion that dissimilar replacement rules for eco-
nomic and for unfair labor practice strikes visits upon labor and man-
agement. An unfair labor practice strike is a work stoppage protesting
an employer's unfair labor practice. It may be called during the term
of a collective agreement57 or may simply be a continuation of an
54. 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1964).
55. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
56. For example, the employee might not be entitled to reinstatement because his job
was deleted for economic reasons. See NLRB v. National Die Casting Co., 207 F.2d 344
(7th Cir. 1953). At present, the Board does not allow strikers who are not entitled to rein-
statement because they are discharged for misconduct to vote. W. Wilton Wood. Inc., 127
NLRB 1675, 1677 (1960).
57. See, e.g., Kitty Clover, Inc., 103 NLRB 1665, enforced, 208 F.2d 212 (8th Cir. 1953).
Also, Mastro Plastics Co. v. NLRIB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956), held that unfair labor practice
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economic strike.58 The Board has always held that during unfair labor
practice strikes only temporary replacements could be utilized" and
that all strikers were, therefore, entitled to reinstatement. 0 The exis-
tence of this rule and the permanent replacement rule for economic
strikes makes it difficult for either party to know its rights when the
union claims management has committed an unfair labor practice dur-
ing an economic strike.61 The union would claim that the strike was
an unfair labor practice strike, and management would claim it was an
economic strike. If the union's allegation is later sustained by the
NLRB, management will be required to give back-pay to those strikers
who were permanently replaced after the date of the illegal practice and
who were not reinstated.6 2 If, however, the union's claim is denied, the
employer would not be liable for back-pay. Since the definition of an
unfair labor practice is an uncertain matter, and since the NLRB and
courts may not decide the case finally for years after the claimed viola-
tion, management and labor are forced to bargain about the strike
settlement without knowing their precise legal relationship. A replace-
ment rule which would apply equally to unfair labor practice and
economic strikes is desirable.
It is clear, though, that only temporary replacements can be allowed
for unfair labor practice strikers. If the Board allowed permanent re-
placement it could not order the employer to give back-pay. And rein-
statement with back-pay is the only effective sanction against an em-
ployer who has violated the Labor Act during the course of an economic
strike. A cease and desist order, issued months after the violation, would
not aid the union whose strike had been broken by the unfair practice.
strikes are limited neither by a no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement nor
by the Labor Act's sixty-day cooling off period. 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
58. The Board's rule is that the unfair labor practice must prolong the economic strike.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Guistina Bros. Lumber Co., 253 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1958). As long as
one concurrent cause of the strike is an unfair labor practice, the strike may also have
economic aims. KARD-TV, 122 NLRB 222 (1958). For a criticism of the Board's finding of
per se prolongation of an economic strike and thus automatic conversion into an unfair
labor practice strike, see Stewart, Conversion of Strikes-Economic to Unfair Labor Prac.
tice: II, 49 U. VA. L. Rav. 1297 (1963).
59. Scobell Chem. Co., 121 NLRB 1130, 1132, enforced, 267 F.2d 922 (1959). However,
up to the time at which an economic strike is converted into an unfair labor practice
strike, the employer may hire permanent replacements. See R. J. Oil & Ref. Co., 108
NLRB 641, 648 (1954).
60. Kitty Clover, Inc., 103 NLRB 1665, enforced, 208 F.2d 212 (8th Cir. 1953). Unfair
labor practice strikers are entitled to vote, Times Square Stores Corp., 79 NLRB 361, 364
(1948), but their replacements are not. Tampa Sand & Material Co., 137 NLRB 1549 (1962).
61. See generally Stewart, Conversion of Strikes: Economic to Unfair Labor Practice
I & II, 45 U. VA. L. Rav. 1332 (1959), 49 U. VA. L. REV. 1297 (1963).
62. Maurice Embroidery Works, Inc., 111 NLRB 1143, 1160 (1955).
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To treat all strikes uniformly a temporary replacement rule must also
be applied in economic strikes.
Considering all of these criticisms only a wooden application of stare
decisis supports the retention of the Mackay rule. Therefore, despite
twenty-eight years of adherence to a rule which allows permanent re-
placement, the Board or the Court should announce a new rule which
allows only temporary replacement during economic strikes03
63. For the same reasons, it would seem that a permanent replacement rule should not
be applied in the lockout context. The anti-union effects would be the same as in the
strike situation and the employer would likewise be unable to demonstrate a legitimate
business purpose. In NLRB v. Brown, 380 US. 278 (1965), the union struck an employer
who was a member of a bargaining association comprised of several retail stores. That
employer hired replacements but retained them only during the strike. The Court held
that the association's non-struck members could respond to the union's action by locking
out their employees under NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union (Buffalo Linen), 353 U.S.
87 (1957), and obtaining, like the struck member, temporary replacements. It was not
decided, however, "whether the case would be the same had the struck employer exercised
its prerogative to hire permanent replacements for the strikers . . . and the non-struck
employers had then hired permanent replacements for their locked-out employees." NLRB
v. Brown, supra at 292 n.6. For the reasons enumerated in this Note, it is clear that neither
the struck nor the non-struck member of a multi-employer bargaining association could
show any legitimate business purpose in hiring permanent replacements. Furthermore,
such replacements should not be allowed in offensive lockouts. When the Supreme Court
in American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 US. 300 (1965) held that, after a bargaining
impasse, the employer could lock out his employees to bring pressure to bear in support of
his legitimate bargaining position, it expressly stated that it intimated no view on whether
the employer could offensively lock out and then hire either temporary or permanent
replacements. Id. at 308 n.8. Again, because he cannot demonstrate any legitimate business
purpose to offset the anti-union effect, the employer should not be allowed to hire perma-
nent replacements. Finally, permanent replacements should not be permitted in lockouts
called by an employer who is fearful of unusual strike damage. The following are ex-
amples of such defensive lockouts. Betts Cadiliac-Olds, Inc., 96 NLRB 268 (1951) (prevent-
ing automobile from being half-repaired when the strike is called); Duluth Bottling Ass'n.
48 NLRB 1335 (1943) (avoiding spoilage from a sudden work stoppage); Link-Belt Co., 26
NLRB 227, 264 (1940) (frustrating the seizure of a plant by a sit down strike).
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